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ABSTRACT
Resilience to electromagnetic jamming and its avoid-
ance are difficult problems. It is often both hard to
distinguish malicious jamming from congestion in the
broadcast regime and a challenge to conceal the activ-
ity patterns of the legitimate communication protocol
from the jammer. In the context of energy-constrained
wireless sensor networks, nodes are scheduled to max-
imize the common sleep duration and coordinate com-
munication to extend their battery life. This results
in well-defined communication patterns with possibly
predictable intervals of activity that are easily detected
and jammed by a statistical jammer. We present an
anti-jamming protocol for sensor networks which elimi-
nates spatio-temporal patterns of communication while
maintaining coordinated and contention-free communi-
cation across the network. Our protocol, WisperNet, is
time-synchronized and uses coordinated temporal ran-
domization for slot schedules and slot durations at the
link layer and adapts routes to avoid jammers in the
network layer. Through analysis, simulation and exper-
imentation we demonstrate that WisperNet reduces the
efficiency of any statistical jammer to that of a random
jammer, which has the lowest censorship-to-link utiliza-
tion ratio. WisperNet has been implemented on the
FireFly sensor network platform.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer-
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1. INTRODUCTION
Jamming is the radiation of electromagnetic energy
in a communication channel which reduces the effec-
tive use of the electromagnetic spectrum for legitimate
communication. Jamming results in a loss of link reli-
ability, increased energy consumption, extended packet
delays and disruption of end-to-end routes. Jamming
may be both malicious with the intention to block com-
munication of an adversary or non-malicious in the form
of unintended channel interference. In the context of
embedded wireless networks for time-critical and safety
critical operation such as in medical devices and indus-
trial control networks, it is essential that mechanisms
for resilience to jamming are native to the communica-
tion protocol. Resilience to jamming and its avoidance,
collectively termed as anti-jamming, is a hard practi-
cal problem as the jammer has an unfair advantage in
detecting legitimate communication activity due to the
broadcast nature of the channel. The jammer can then
emit a sequence of electromagnetic pulses to raise the
noise floor and disrupt communication. Communica-
tion nodes are unable to differentiate jamming signals
from legitimate transmissions or changes in communica-
tion activity due to node movement or nodes powering
off without some minimum processing at the expense of
local and network resources.
In the case of energy-constrained wireless sensor net-
works, nodes are scheduled to maximize the common
sleep duration and coordinate communication to ex-
tend their battery life. With greater network synchro-
nization, the communication is more energy-efficient as
nodes wake up from low-power operation just before the
common communication interval. Such coordination in-
troduces temporal patterns in communication with pre-
dictable intervals of transmission activity. Channel ac-
cess patterns make it efficient for a jammer to scan and
jam the channel only during activity intervals. The jam-
mer can time its pulse transmission to coincide with the
preambles of packets from legitimate nodes and thus
have a high censorship to channel utilization ratio while
remaining difficult to detect. The jammer is thus able to
exploit the temporal patterns in communication to dis-
rupt a transmission of longer length of legitimate trans-
missions with a small set of jamming pulses.
For nodes in fixed locations, a jammer can select re-
gions with heavier communication activity or denser
connectivity to increase the probability that a random
jamming pulse results in corrupting an on-going trans-
mission. Nodes in the proximity of the jammer will
endure a high cost of operation in terms of energy con-
sumption and channel utilization with a low message
delivery rate. They must either physically re-locate or
increase the cost of their links so the network may adapt
its routes.
Methods for anti-jamming must therefore address threats
due to both temporal patterns at the link layer and spa-
tial distribution of routes in the network layer. Our
goal in designing WisperNet, an anti-jamming proto-
col is to reduce or eliminate spatio-temporal patterns in
communication while maintaining energy-efficient, coor-
dinated and collision-free operation in multi-hop wire-
less sensor networks. We achieve this by incorporating
coordinated temporal randomization for slot schedules
and slot durations between each node and its k-hop
neighbors. This prevents the jammer from predicting
the epoch and length of the next activity on the chan-
nel. Such mechanisms reduce the effectiveness of any
statistical jammer to that of a random pulse jammer.
While temporal randomization prevents statistical jam-
mers from determining any useful packet inter-arrival
distribution for preemptive attacks, it still has an effi-
ciency of a random jammer and can achieve censorship
which increases linearly with channel utilization and
jamming activity. To avoid such random jammers which
are co-located near nodes with active routes, we employ
adaptive routing to select paths such that the highest
possible end-to-end packet delivery ratios are achieved.
We combine the above temporal and spatial schemes in
a tightly synchronized protocol where legitimate nodes
are implicitly coordinated network-wide while ensuring
no spatio-temporal patterns in communication are ex-
posed to external observers.
In the context of multi-hop embedded wireless net-
works, which are battery-operated and require low-energy
consumption, we require the following properties from
the anti-jamming protocol:
1. Non-predictable schedules: Transmission in-
stances (e.g. slot assignments) are randomized and non-
repeating to prevent the jammer from predicting the
timing of the next slot based on observations of channel
activity. In this way, even if the jammer successfully
estimates slot sizes, it has to transmit pulse attacks at
an interval of the average slot duration to corrupt com-
munication between nodes.
2. Non-predictable slot sizes: Slots are randomly
sized on a packet-by-packet basis in order to prevent the
jammer from estimating the duration of channel activity
for energy efficient reactive jamming. This requirement
further reduces the jammer’s lifetime as it will need to
employ the smallest observed slot duration as its jam-
ming interval.
3. Coordinated and scheduled transmission: The
communication schedule according to which a node trans-
mits is known to all of its legitimate neighbors so they
can wake up to receive the message during its trans-
mission slot. This also prevents nodes from turning on
their receiver when no legitimate activity is scheduled
and hence reduces the likelihood of a jammer draining
the energy of a node.
4. Coordinated changes of slot sizes: All nodes
must be aware of the current and next slot sizes. This is
very important because any incompatibility or synchro-
nization error would disable communication between le-
gitimate nodes.
5. Collision-free transmission: Communication must
satisfy the hidden terminal problem so that a transmit
slot of a given node does not conflict with transmit slots
of nodes within its k-hop interference range.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2, we provide a background and related work for
energy efficient protocols and energy efficient jamming
schemes. In Section 3, we provide an overview of the
WisperNet anti-jamming protocol and describe the co-
ordinated temporal randomization scheme. In Section
4, we describe the WisperNet coordinated spatial adap-
tation scheme. Section 5 describes our implementation
experiences and experimental results followed by the
conclusion.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
To understand the inherent tradeoff between energy
efficient link protocols with well-defined schedules and
their susceptibility to jamming attacks, we first describe
the different types of jammers and their impact on var-
ious types of link layer protocols. We then highlight a
particular class of statistical jammers and their impact
on energy-efficient sensor network link protocols.
2.1 Jammers and Trade-offs with Jamming
2.1.1 Comparison of Jamming Models
In [1] and [2], Xu et al. introduce four common types
of jammers: constant, random, reactive and deceptive.
Constant jammers continually emit a jamming signal
and achieve the highest censorship of packets corrupted
to total packets transmitted. The constant jammer,
however, is not energy-efficient and can be easily de-
tected and localized. The random jammer is similar to
the constant jammer but operates at a lower duty cy-
cle with intervals of sleep. A random jammer transmits
a jamming signal at instances derived from a uniform
distribution with a known minimum and maximum in-
terval. The censorship ratio of the random jammer is
constant and invariant to channel utilization. At low
duty cycles, the random jammer is difficult to detect
and avoid. A reactive jammer keeps its receiver always
on and listens for channel activity. If a known preamble
pattern is detected, the reactive jammer quickly emits
a jamming signal to corrupt the current transmission.
Reactive jammers, while effective in corrupting a large
proportion of legitimate packets, are not energy efficient
as the receiver is always on.
Another type of reactive jammer uses a simple phys-
ical layer energy detector as sensing and wake-up ra-
dios. These agile jammers wait until channel activity is
detected and then jam. Although energy to ‘listen’ is
lower, this behavior is also energy inefficient since any
kind of channel activity triggers a transmission of a jam-
ming pulse. Due to physical layer delays these jammers
are effective in jamming the fraction of packets that are
greater than a certain threshold length.
A deceptive or protocol-aware jammer is one that has
knowledge of the link protocol being used and the de-
pendencies between packet types. Such a jammer ex-
ploits temporal and sequential patterns of the protocol
and is very effective.
In [3], a statistical jamming model is described where
the jammer first observes temporal patterns in chan-
nel activity, extracts a histogram of inter-arrival times
between transmissions and schedules jamming pulses
based on the observed distribution. This results in a
very effective jammer that is not protocol-aware and
is also difficult to detect. A statistical jammer chooses
its transmission interval to coincide with the peak inter-
arrival times and is thus able to maximize its censorship
ratio with relatively little effort. Fig. 1(a) illustrates
the relative censorship ratio and the energy-efficiency of
the different jammers. Fig. 1(b) illustrates the relative
stealth or difficulty in detection. We observe that the
statistical jammer has a high censorship ratio with both
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Jammer’s Energy efficiency vs. (a)
Censorship ratio (b) Stealth
energy-efficient and stealthy operation and hence focus
on combating such jamming.
2.1.2 Techniques for Robust Transmission
The traditional defenses against jamming include spread
spectrum techniques[4] and frequency hopping at the
physical layer. While these techniques are important
physical layer mechanisms for combating jamming, ad-
ditional protection is required at the packet-level. As
in the case of standard wireless protocols such as IEEE
802.11 and Bluetooth, the jammer may know the pseudo-
random noise code or frequency hopping sequence.
There have been several efforts to make communica-
tion in sensor networks more robust in the presence of
a jammer. In [5], Wood et al. described DEEJAM, a
link layer protocol that includes several schemes for ro-
bust IEEE 802.15.4 based communication for reactive
and random jammers. While mechanisms such as cod-
ing and fragmentation are proposed, the jammer still
has a competitive advantage in that it may increase the
power of its jamming signal and a single jamming sig-
nal is capable of jamming multiple links in the vicinity.
The authors assume that reactive jammers can be con-
sidered energy-efficient. Current radio transceivers with
the IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer of communication, use
almost the same, if not greater, energy for receiving as
they do for transmission [6].
In cases where resilience to jamming is not possible,
it is useful to detect and estimate the extent to which
the jammer has influence over the network. A jammed-
area mapping protocol is described in [7] which can be
used to delineate regions affected by a jammer. Such
information can ultimately be used for network routing.
One of the requirements of the protocol is that every
node knows its own position along with positions of all
its neighbors. WisperNet, does not require such position
and direction information and directly computes routes
with the highest end-to-end packet delivery rate.
2.2 Impact of Jamming on MAC Protocols
We now investigate the characteristics of different classes
of sensor network link protocols and the impact of a
jammer on each class.
Figure 2: Comparison of robustness to jamming
and energy efficiency of sensor MAC protocols
2.2.1 Energy-Efficient MAC Protocols
Several MAC protocols have been proposed for low-
power operation for multi-hop wireless mesh networks.
Such protocols may be categorized by their use of time
synchronization as asynchronous [8], loosely synchronous [9,
10] and fully synchronized protocols [11, 12]. In gen-
eral, with a greater degree of synchronization between
nodes, packet delivery is more energy-efficient due to
the minimization of idle listening when there is no com-
munication, better collision avoidance and elimination
of overhearing of neighbor conversations.
Asynchronous protocols such as Carrier Sense Mul-
tiple Access (CSMA) are susceptible to jamming both at
the transmitter (busy channel indication) and at the re-
ceiver (energy drain). The Berkeley MAC (B-MAC) [8]
protocol performs excellent in terms of energy conserva-
tion and simplicity in design. B-MAC supports CSMA
with low power listening (LPL) where each node peri-
odically wakes up after a sample interval and checks the
channel for activity for a short duration of 0.25ms. If the
channel is found to be active, the node stays awake to
receive the payload following an extended preamble. Us-
ing this scheme, nodes may efficiently check for neighbor
activity while maintaining no explicit schedule which a
statistical jammer may exploit.
Loosely-synchronous protocols such as S-MAC [9]
and T-MAC [13] employ local sleep-wake schedules
know as virtual clustering between node pairs to coor-
dinate packet exchanges while reducing idle operation.
Both schemes exchange synchronizing packets to inform
their neighbors of the interval until their next activity
and use CSMA prior to transmissions. S-MAC results
in clustering of channel activity and is hence vulnerable
to a statistical jammer.
Synchronous protocols such as RT-Link [12], uti-
lize hardware based time synchronization to precisely
and periodically schedule activity in well-defined TDMA
slots. RT-Link utilizes an out-of-band synchronization
mechanism using an AM broadcast pulse. Each node is
equipped with two radios, an AM receiver for time syn-
chronization and an 802.15.4 transceiver for data com-
munication. A central synchronization unit periodically
transmits a 50µs AM sync pulse. Each node wakes
up just before the expected pulse epoch and synchro-
nizes the operating system upon detecting the pulse.
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Figure 3: SMAC PDF for 15% utilization
As the out-of-band sync pulse is a high-power (30W)
signal with no encoded data, it is not easily jammed by
a malicious sensor node.
In general, RT-Link outperforms B-MAC which in
turn out-performs S-MAC in terms of battery life across
all event intervals [12]. Fig. 2 shows the relative node
lifetimes for 2AA batteries and similar transmission duty
cycles. Here node lifetimes for CSMA, S-MAC, B-MAC,
and RT-link are 0.19, 0.54, 0.78 and 1.5 years respec-
tively for a network of 10 nodes with a 10s event sam-
ple period (based on measurement values from [12], [9]).
While RT-Link nodes communicate in periodic and well-
defined fixed-size time slots, a statistical jammer is able
to easily determine the channel activity schedule and
duration of each scheduled transmission. An attacker
can glean the channel activity pattern by scanning the
channel and schedule a jamming signal to coincide with
the packet preamble at the start of a time slot.
2.2.2 Statistical Jamming
We focus on the statistical jammer’s performance with
S-MAC and RT-Link as both result in explicit patterns
in packet inter-arrival times. We do not consider B-
MAC as we aim to leverage the more energy-efficient
RT-Link as a base synchronized link-layer mechanism
for WisperNet. We simulated a network of 10 nodes in
each case, with a 3ms average transmission duration.
In the case of S-MAC, we observe that all nodes quickly
converge on one major activity period of 215ms. In
Fig. 3, we also notice a spike close to 2ms. This is the
interval between the transmission of control packets and
data packets at the start of an activity period. In the
case of RT-Link, we simulated four flows with different
rates and hence observe 4 distinct spikes in Fig. 4. The
other spikes with lower intensity are harmonics due to
multiples of 32 slots in a frame. In both cases we observe
distinct inter-arrival patterns which enable a statistical
jammer to efficiently attack both protocols.
2.3 Assumptions
We make several assumptions in the design and eval-
uation of WisperNet. We assume the jammer is as
energy-constrained as a legitimate node and must main-
tain a stealth operation with a low duty-cycle. All pack-
ets exchanged between nodes are encrypted with a group
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Figure 4: RT-Link PDF for 15% utilization
key shared by legitimate nodes and hence the jammer
is not protocol-aware. We consider both malicious and
non-malicious jamming and do not differentiate between
them as the anti-jamming mechanisms are native to the
link and network protocol. The transmission power is
0dBm (1mW) and in the worst case (with maximum
power link jamming) the nominal packet delivery rate
is never below 2˜0%. This has been demonstrated in pre-
vious experiments [12]. For simplicity, we presume that
interference range is equal to the transmission range of
one hop. This restriction does not limit our results. We
assume all communication is between a central gateway
and each of the nodes across one or more hops.
3. ANTI-JAMMING WITH COORDINATED
SPATIO-TEMPORAL RANDOMIZATION
An effective approach to diminish the impact of a
statistical jammer on TDMA-based MAC protocols is
to eliminate the possibility to extract patterns in com-
munication. These patterns appear as a result of the
use of fixed schedules which are set when a node joins
a network and are assumed to repeat till the network
is disbanded. Such simple and repetitive patterns are
maintained with tight time synchronization and result
in minimal energy consumption, deterministic end-to-
end delay and perhaps maximal transmission concur-
rency. In order to limit the impact of statistical jamming
but still benefit from the above energy and timeliness
performance, we maintain the time synchronization but
change the schedule, transmission duration and routes
in a randomized yet coordinated manner.
Two components of the WisperNet protocol are Co-
ordinated Temporal Randomization (WisperNet-Time)
and Coordinated Spatial Adaptation (WisperNet-Space),
which perform different actions in the temporal and spa-
tial domains respectively. WisperNet-Time is designed
to defeat statistical jammers. By randomizing the com-
munication in time, a statistical jammer’s performance
is reduced to that of a random jammer as the distribu-
tion of packet inter-arrival times is flat. No timing-based
scheme can reduce the probability of being jammed by
a random pulse jammer. In this case, the only way to
decrease the jamming impact is by avoiding the jammed
areas using WisperNet-Space. WisperNet-Space imple-
ments adaptive network routing as a jamming avoid-
ance mechanism to use links which are less affected
by the jammer, if possible. Both WisperNet-Time and
WisperNet-Space incorporate on-line algorithms where
the network is continuously monitored and node opera-
tions are adjusted in time and space.
3.1 WisperNet-Time: Co-ordinated Temporal
Randomization
The main requirement for the proposed protocol is the
provision of tight time synchronization between nodes.
In order to keep coordination between nodes, all nodes
have to be informed about current network state in
terms of current slot schedule, current slot duration and
current active network topology. We achieve this by
building upon the FireFly sensor network platform [14]
and using the basic synchronizationmechanisms adopted
in the RT-Link protocol. All communication with RT-
Link is in designated time slots. 32 time slots form a
frame and 32 frames form a cycle. The time sync pulse is
received once every cycle. Each FireFly node is capable
of both hardware-based global time synchronization and
software-based in-band time sync. A second require-
ment for WisperNet is that changes in state should re-
quire minimum gateway-to-node communication and no
state information exchange between nodes. All commu-
nication must be encrypted and authenticated so that
an eavesdropper may not be able to extract the logical
state of the network. We describe the authentication
and implicit coordination scheme in the following sec-
tion and the synchronization mechanism in the Imple-
mentation section.
3.1.1 Schedule Randomization
The first step toward schedule randomization is a prun-
ing of the physical network topology graph into a di-
rected acyclical graph. Fig. 5(a) shows an example net-
work topology graph, where each edge represents phys-
ical wireless link between two nodes. The physical net-
work topology is logically pruned by disabling desired
links. In order to logically remove a link, a node is sched-
uled to sleep during that particular neighbor’s transmis-
sion, thereby ignoring that transmission. By forming a
directed acyclic graph we are able to efficiently assign
non-colliding schedules that can be changed for every
frame, as shown in Fig. 5(b). Links marked by the
dashed line are inactive but must be accounted for by
any graph coloring algorithm.
The algorithm for schedule randomization is orga-
nized in a distributed manner. Every node uses a Pseudo-
Random Function (PRF) to obtain its transmission sched-
ule from the current network key and its node ID. The
transmission schedule consists of different slot indexes
that can be used for transmission to neighboring nodes.
(a) Physical network
topology
(b) Logical network topology
Figure 5: (a)Example network topology (b)
collision-free, frame-to-frame transmit schedule
Figure 6: Generation of keys at the gateway, us-
ing a one-way hash function.
The schedule changes for every frame (i.e. 32 slots) and
during a frame, a node transmits only on the time-slots
determined by its PRF output. After transmission, ev-
ery node goes to sleep, setting its sleep timer to wake
up for the earliest receive or transmit slot. In this way
energy consumption is reduced to minimum.
To obtain non-repeating schedules, but with full co-
ordination between nodes, the PRF computed by every
node uses the current active network key along with
its node ID. Once in a cycle, between two synchroniza-
tion pulses, the gateway broadcasts the active keys for
the next cycle. The keys, members of the one-way key
chain, are generated during gateway’s initialization and
are stored in its memory. All keys from this chain are
calculated from randomly chosen last key Kn by repeat-
edly applying one-way function F (as shown in Fig. 6):
Kj = F (Kj+1), j = 0, 1, 2, ...n− 1.
As F is a one-way function, all previous members of
chain (K0,K1, ...,Kj−1) can be calculated from some
chain element Kj but subsequent chain members Kj ,
Kj+1,...,Kn [15] cannot be derived. This authentication
scheme is similar to [16, 17] but its use for scheduling is
new.
We use the SHA1-HMAC[18] keyed-hash function to
generate the current slot schedule. Therefore, for sched-
ule computation HMAC(ID,Kj) is used, where Kj
presents currently active network key (member of the
one-way key chain). SHA1-HMAC outputs 160 bits
which are used to specify the schedule of transmission
slots for each of the 32 frames. These 160 bits are di-
vided into 32 groups of 5-bits, where the node’s transmit
schedule in i-th frame (i = 0, 1, 2, ...31) is determined by
i-th group of 5 bits. These 5 bits represent the randomly
selected slot index in each of the 32 frames.
Figure 7: Implicit conflict resolution
Implicit Schedule Conflict Resolution
This approach for determining the transmission sched-
ule locally can introduce a problem of potential inter-
ference that may occur when neighboring nodes are as-
signed the same random slot. To prevent this, every
node, in addition to its schedule, calculates a slot prece-
dence (or priority) for every transmission. The prece-
dence for the i-th frame’s transmission schedule is de-
termined by (32−i)-th 5 bits group (i.e. reverse order of
the transmission schedule). Since the number of frames
is even, the transmission schedule and precedence are
never extracted from same group of bits. Therefore, to
compute its schedule in one sync period with 32 frames,
each node has to calculate exactly one SHA1-HMAC
function for itself, and one SHA1-HMAC per node for
all nodes in its k-hop interference range. We assume the
node IDs of all k-hop neighbors are known (when node
joins the network it broadcast its ID to all its neighbors
in k-hop range). Given the IDs for all nodes in its k-hop
radius, a node calculates the schedule and precedence
for all of neighbors as shown in Figure 7. After sched-
ule conflicts are resolved implicitly based on the higher
precedence, the node follows the combined transmit and
receive schedule in a single vector.
3.1.2 Slot size randomization
Even though the statistical jammer uses energy effi-
cient pulse attacks, the proposed schedule randomiza-
tion reduces its efficiency to that of a random jammer.
However, with the schedule randomization, an adver-
sary is able to estimate slot sizes from the probability
distribution function (PDF) of packet inter-arrival times
[3]. This statistical jamming scheme allows the jammer
to transmit short pulse attacks at beginning of each slot,
therefore corrupting all communication attempts. Al-
though this jamming scheme is less energy efficient than
a fixed schedule TDMA protocol, it is still more efficient
than a random jammer.
Slot size randomization is implemented in a similar
manner to slot schedule randomization, using SHA1-
HMAC, as schedule randomization, but with one im-
portant difference. Instead of using the last revealed
key for the slot size calculation, every node uses a shared
predefined key, Kslot, and the network’s state counter
cnt. Therefore, for slot size randomization the PRF is
Figure 8: Slot size randomization on a frame-by-
frame basis
calculated as HMAC(cnt,Kslot). The cycle counter is
transmitted in the header of each packet and is incre-
mented every cycle. Kslot is intentionally a local key so
that a node joining the network will be able to synchro-
nize its slot sizes after receiving one legitimate packet.
The SHA1-HMAC’s output, which is also calculated on
a frame-by-frame basis, defines the slot size for the next
frame as shown in Fig. 8. The network’s state counter
represents the number of sync pulses received by the
network, and its value is exchanged between neighbor-
ing nodes in the header of every packet. Here we assume
that every sync pulse is received as it is a global and
high-power AM pulse. Therefore it is only nodes who
want to join an already operational network need to be
informed about current network counter. The proposed
coordinated slot size randomization scheme assures that
all nodes know the current frame’s slot sizes and allows
them to calculate an accurate time interval for their
transmissions/receptions.
If a key from the key chain is used for slot size cal-
culation instead a predefined one, in cases when node
does not receive a key from the gateway would result
in complete loss of synchronization. Without correct
information about a slot size, nodes that do not know
the current frame size are not able to schedule them-
selves to wake-up for the expected sync pulse. With the
predefined key used for slot size calculations, nodes are
always able to know size of each frame, therefore they
can schedule their awakening on time.
Slot sizes have values from a discrete set, where the
set size is determined by the number of PRF output
bits. The number of values used for slot sizes and rel-
ative distance between them have direct influence on
PDF of packet inter-arrivals times. The goal of our anti-
jamming scheme is to have a uniform PDF, or at least
a PDF with spikes flattened as much as possible, which
does not allow timing information extraction. It is rec-
ommended that at least 8 slot sizes with small relative
difference between them be used.
Slot size randomization requires additional memory
resources if nodes need to send some fixed-size data
block in a fixed time interval. In this case slot sizes
can be both smaller and bigger than the size necessary
for data block transmission, which can result in lower
network utilization in former case or data congestion in
later case. In the latter case, a portion of the data avail-
able for transmission will have to be buffered in node’s
internal queue till the next transmission slot occurs. In
this case, the average slot size must be larger than slot
size needed for one data block transmission. The size
of the queue needed in every node is directly connected
with ratio between these two sizes.
3.2 WisperNet-Time: Performance Analysis
We now investigate the impact of channel utilization
on the PDF of packet inter-arrival times. We also deter-
mine the buffering needs due to randomized slot sizing
and its impact on the end-to-end delay. Finally we look
at the censorship ratio vs. jammer’s lifetime for RT-
Link, S-MAC and WisperNet.
We conducted a simulation in Matlab on a protocol
with structure similar to RT-Link [12], where each cycle
consists of 32 frames and each frame consists of 32 slots.
At the beginning of every cycle a sync pulse is trans-
mitted. We have simulated a system where slot sizes
have uniform distribution with values in range [1 5]ms.
A maximum slot size of 5ms is chosen to match the
maximum message size of 128 bytes for IEEE 802.15.4
transceiver with data rate of 250kbps[6]. 128 bytes can
be sent with transmission duration of 4.2ms and the rest
of the slot time is used for inter-slot processing and for
guard times. A simulation for 10000 sync cycles was
carried out, which on an average lasts 50 minutes.
We first simulated the influence of the link utiliza-
tion factor (U ) on the PDF of inter-arrival times and
show that it has very little influence with the proposed
scheme. This is one of the major benefits of WisperNet-
Time, because for other protocols the only way to reduce
spikes in the PDF is to reduce the utilization factor, as
proposed in [3]. Results for PDF of inter-arrival times
are shown in in Fig. 9 for U = 50%, where slot sizes were
randomly chosen from one of the 32 possible values in
desired span. While channel utilization has an effect to
the PDF, it is to a signficantly smaller extent than in
B-MAC’s case. We observe that the peak of the PDF is
less than 2% and no patterns can be extracted by the
jammer. With U below 50%, a small increment can be
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Figure 9: (Top) PDF of inter-arrival times for
WisperNet. (Bottom) Corresponding CDF.
seen on spikes in (5 10]ms interval. Also with integer
multiples of some slot sizes within [1 5]ms interval, in-
fluence of U can almost be ignored. Due to the uniform
distribution for all three cases of U it is not possible to
extract slot sizes.
3.2.1 Impact on End-to-end Delay
To analyze how the slot size changes affect the end-
to-end delay, we simulated a 1-dimension chain with 20
nodes. In every frame, each node forwards the previ-
ously received data to next node. If the slot size is
smaller than necessary to transmit the backlogged data,
the maximum allowed packet size is sent and a rest of
the data is buffered. In a simulated chain, the source
node periodically receives fixed size data blocks with a
smaller size than for an average slot size (e.g. 3ms).
Fig. 10 presents PDF and CDF of delay at last node
for different slot’s size quantizations. We observe that
with finer quantization of slot sizes, the distribution in-
terval of the last node has not only a smaller maximum
delay but also a smaller possible set of delay values that
can be expected. The reason is that finer quantization
allows better data distribution per packets and there-
fore reduces the delay caused with packets fragmenta-
tion. Expectedly, this randomization introduced some
additional delay. In a TDMA system with a constant
slot size of 3ms, the delay at the last node would be
20 · 3ms = 60ms. Here average delay is around 75ms,
but with 95% probability interval [67 88]ms. This shows
that randomization introduces some variability into the
communication end-to-end delay estimation.
The first node requires a buffer with an additional 512
bytes of memory for data queuing while all other require
an additional buffer for one maximum sized packet.
3.2.2 Comparative Analysis of MAC Protocols
Fig. 14 presents the relationship between the jam-
mer’s lifetime (LIFE) and censorship ratio (CR) for com-
munication in its range. We simulated the influence
of two types of jammers - statistical jammers (SJ) and
random jammers (RJ) - on different kinds of protocols.
Both these types of jammers transmit 150µs-long pulse
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Figure 10: Message delay and its Cumulative
Distribution at last node, for 20 nodes chain
attacks. We modeled these attacks with a 90% suc-
cess rate of packet corruption in cases when jamming
pulse is transmitted during a node’s communication.
For RT-Link and WisperNet-Time, we used the previ-
ously described protocols, while for the Random Sched-
ule TDMA (RSTDMA) we also used 32 slots per frame,
where every slot is 3ms long. All protocols are simulated
for systems with 25% of network utilization.
As we expected, for RT-Link and S-MAC, the SJ’s
lifetime is very high. As shown, RSTDMA is easily
jammed and the SJ enjoys the longest lifetime. In ad-
dition, the slot size randomization component decreases
the jammer’s lifetime, for almost 0.1 years at 50% CR.
Note that differences between LIFE-CR curve for SJ
and RJ are caused only by the fact that SJ does not
transmit pulses in intervals smaller than 1ms, which,
in this case, is the smallest slot size (only parameter
that can be extracted from input signal statistics). We
observe that schedule randomization has a significantly
higher impact on the jammer’s lifetime than does slot
size randomization. This justifies our decision to use
a pre-stored key for the latter’s calculations, while us-
ing keys from the gateway’s one-way chain for former.
If some nodes are captured and compromised, only the
predefined slot-size key would risk being extracted.
4. WISPERNET-SPACE:
COORDINATED SPATIAL ADAPTATION
We now discuss spatial aspect of anti-jamming. For
the WisperNet-Space, we consider a dense sensor net-
work where each node is modeled as a unit disk graph.
The network is represented as an undirected graphG(V,E)
where V is a set of nodes (vertices) and E a set of links
(edges). For each link e = e(u, v), k weights (or costs)
wj(u, v), (j = 1, 2, ..., k) are associated. For a tree T in
graph G, the aggregate weight Wj(T ) is defined as
Wj(T ) =
∑
e∈T
wj(e), j = 1, 2, ..., k
Weights associated with each link describe the different
types of costs which may include the network’s para-
functional properties, such as reliability of network com-
munication, or delay and energy consumption of a sen-
sor network.
In general a set L ⊆ V of terminal nodes is given and
the objective is to find a connected subgraph, spanning
all the terminals with minimal aggregate weights for all
j = 1, 2, ...k. If only one weighting function is consid-
ered, L = V and the connected subgraph is required to
be a tree, then the problem is defined as a Minimum
Spanning Tree problem (MST). The MST problem can
be solved using known algorithms (Kruskal’s, Boruvka’s,
etc) [19]. If L 6= V and also only one weighting function
is considered, problem is equivalent to Steiner minimal
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Figure 11: (a) Dependency between jammer’s lifetime and Censorship Ratio and (b) zoomed
tree problem (SMT). SMT is a NP-complete problem,
but several heuristics exist which resolve SMT problem
in both a centralized and a distributed manner.
For WisperNet-Space we only considered network re-
liability, so we associate a reliability weight function for
each link in network. We define the weight of each link
to be a function of the packet loss ratio and hence aim
to derive routes which connect all essential nodes us-
ing most reliable links. The continuous execution of the
cost minimization function, essentially allows evasion of
links under the influence of a random jammer.
The network’s reliability is measured in terms of its
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) which is defined as the
ratio of packets that are successfully delivered to a des-
tination [2]. PDR can be perceived as the probability
of error-free communication between two nodes. Thus,
the reliability of a path P in the given network can be
defined as a
∏
e∈P PDR(e). Our goal is to achieve max-
imum reliability on a path P , which is equivalent to
maximizing
ln
∏
e∈P
PDR(e) =
∑
e∈P
lnPDR(e).
With PDR(e) ≤ 1 for path P , our goal is to minimize∑
e∈P |lnPDR(e)|. Therefore, the reliability weight for
some link e = e(u, v) is defined as
wr(u, v) = |lnPDR(u, v)|.
4.1 Active topology update
For adaptive routing in WisperNet-Space, we use a
MST-Steiner heuristic to solve the SMT problem. All
active nodes periodically send the PDRs for all their ac-
tive links to the gateway. After receiving a link’s weight,
the gateway updates its weight table for all existing links
in the network. Since the PDR is not defined for inactive
(not used) links, these links keep same weights as they
had prior to activation of the present network topology.
Their weights can not be reset to zero, since that would
allow some heavily jammed links to become competitive
for network routing right in next iteration.
In order to defend against mobile jammers, the weights
of unused network’s links are processed in time with a
leaky integrator. To avoid situations where some pre-
viously heavily jammed link still has a high weight al-
though the jammer that caused it has moved away, for
every link e = e(u, v) and the current active subgraph
T , the reliability weight for the next network topology
calculation is defined as:
wr(u, v) =
{
|lnPDR(u, v)|, e ∈ T
ρ · wr(u, v), e /∈ T
ρ (0 < ρ < 1) is a leaky constant that determines a speed
of network’s adaptation to jammers’ mobility. It is not
recommended to set a very small value for ρ, since some-
thing similar to previously described situation can hap-
pen, when a jammed link can be repeatedly included in
active topology after very short duration. For example
with ρ = 0.8 reliability weight for unused link would be
reduced by 20% for every calculation of network topol-
ogy, which would allow inclusion of the jammed link into
new topology after only a few iterations. If all jammers
have fixed positions, ρ can be set to 1.
After updating its weights table, the gateway calcu-
lates the new active topology with minimum costs to
reach all Steiner points (i.e. active nodes). To distribute
the information about active links, we used the Prufer
code (sequence) [19], a unique sequence associated with
a tree, which for a tree withN vertices containsN−2 el-
ements. In addition to this code, we send a second code
sequence that maps the node ID of the active nodes to
the index of the N − 2 sequence. In a case of dense
networks, with N nodes, from which the Steiner tree is
derived, a much smaller number of nodes (M) may be
active. Therefore for allM nodes from the Steiner tree,
different temporal IDs are assigned from 1 :M interval,
and for that tree, a Prufer code with M − 2 elements is
derived. Along with this sequence and number of active
nodes, M , a look-up table with size M is sent, where
i-th position in this table contains ID of a node, that
is indexed as i while creating the Prufer code sequence.
In this way only 2 ·M − 1 values are sent from gateway
and can be encapsulated within one maximum-sized 128
byte IEEE 802.15.4 packet.
4.2 Topology Maintenance and Updates
WisperNet-Space computes a new network topology
every 128 cycles. Given the average slot size of 3ms
and 1024 slots/cycle, the topology update occurs every
6.4 minutes on average. The current active topology in-
cludes a subset of the node population as active nodes
and the unused node, which are not part of the active
topology, are considered inactive nodes. The key chal-
lenge during a topology update is to activate the inactive
nodes, which operate at a very low duty cycle.
At the beginning of the new topology distribution all
currently active nodes are informed about new active
topology by a broadcast from the gateway. To acti-
vate inactive nodes, which are to be part of the topol-
ogy update, 8 slots after the sync pulse are reserved for
asynchronous communication. We refer to these 8 slots
in each cycle to be the ‘topology configuration’ frame.
Thus topology maintenance and updates account for a
0.78% overhead.
Algorithm 1 describes the gateway’s procedure for
topology dissemination. The generated message with
the information about new network topology is distributed
over the network using all active links. Since some cur-
rently inactive nodes may be part of next active topol-
ogy, the mechanism to inform them is included.
Algorithm 1 Gateway procedure description
while 1 do
if NewWeightArrive then
Update Weight Table
if AllReceived or TopologyT imerOn then
TableUpdated← 1
end if
end if
if TableUpdated then
SMT
CalculateSpreadingSchedule
FloodNetwork
end if
end while
All nodes that are used for activation of the inac-
tive nodes along with the new topology receive 3-bit
index of the slot dedicated for its transmission, in the
8 slots ‘configuration’ frame. Using this index, each
nodes schedule its transmission of the new configura-
tion to neighboring node and keep on transmitting it on
the same slot in every ‘configuration’ frame. Once all
its required neighboring nodes (i.e. currently active or
inactive nodes that need to be activated) are heard re-
transmitting the new topology update, a node is assured
that its topology has been successfully updated.
All inactive nodes wake up after every sync pulse, and
listen for the first 8 slots in a cycle. If the message for
its activation is received, a node switches to active mode
and executes the active mode’s algorithm.
Since new topology is computed once in 128 cycles,
1024 configuration slots are available for both activa-
tion of dormant nodes and also for association of newly
added nodes. Our experiments showed that for networks
with less than 500 nodes all inactive nodes are activated
in the first 10% of these slots. Given this, we allowed
the last 20% of these slots (i.e. configuration slots 820-
1024) to be used as contention slots for addmission of
new nodes only. These slots enable nodes that want to
join the network to announce their presence to neigh-
boring nodes (via a HELLO packet in RT-Link), so that
they can be initially included as inactive nodes in the
network.
4.3 WisperNet-Space: Performance Analysis
In order to evaluate the performance of WisperNet-
Space under random jamming attacks we first simulated
an SMT network with a random topology. A network
with 400 randomly distributed nodes in a 4km x 4km
square was analyzed. We also randomly distributed nine
jamming nodes, each with the same RF characteristics
as network’s nodes. To emphasize the jamming effect in
order to test WisperNet-Space’s adaptation, the jam-
mers’ link utilization is set to 50%. We implemented a
communication protocol so that all neighboring nodes
exchange exactly one message per frame. Changes in
network routes for both SMT and MST components are
performed once in 100 frames. In our experiments we
used a value of 0.999 for ρ, which decreases reliability
weight of unused link by 1% for every period of 96 sec-
onds (on average).
Fig. 12(a) presents the initial network topology and
the initial routes. The terminal nodes and the areas un-
der attack by the jammers are highlighted. We observe
a large number of active links are under attack. The
average censorship ratio for this network is 9% for this
startup configuration. The censorship ratio decreases to
less than 1% as the routes adapt to more realible paths
and it can not go below this minimum value. The best
configuration (Fig. 13) includes 0 links jammed in both
direction and 2 links jammed in only one direction.
We observed that at some intermediate moments (for
example moments t1 and t2 as seen in Fig. 12(b) and cor-
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Figure 13: Number of links jammed in 2/1 di-
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(a) Network topology - beginning
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(b) At an intermediate time t1
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(c) Network topology - best
Figure 12: Network topology; green links - actual, ‘physical’ links; red - links used for Steiner tree;
blue nodes - terminal nodes (members of set L); dark gray area - area under jammers’ influence
responding Fig. 14) network routes with more jammed
links were chosen, which directly resulted in increase of
the overall censorship ratio. This is more prominent at
the beginning of the WisperNet-Space’s operation when
all links start with the same minimum weight (0). We
see in Fig. 12(b), three links are jammed in both direc-
tions in the top-right corner. As this procedure of refin-
ing the route continues and more links are evaluated for
the first time, the algorithm will choose jammed links
only if its weight, due to the leaky integrator, drops be-
low a threshold that would make the aggregate weight
of a subgraph smaller than the aggregate weight of the
currently used subgraph. We observe these spikes in the
network’s censorship ratio in Fig. 14. Fig. 12(c) presents
the best solution where only two links from highlighted
area, jammed in only one direction, are used for rout-
ing. Over the course of the adaptation for one hour, we
observer that the number of active links does not vary
much. We also noticed the stretch factor of the network
path lengths was always ≤1.3.
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
TheWisperNet anti-jamming protocol was implemented
on a network of FireFly sensor nodes[14]. Each node
consists of a microcontroller, an IEEE 802.15.4, 2.4 GHz
transceiver and multiple sensors. FireFly nodes have an
add-on AM radio receiver for receiving an out-of-band
AM sync pulse. In order to achieve the highly accurate
time synchronization required for TDMA at a packet
level granularity, we use a carrier-current AM trans-
mitter to provide an out-of-band time synchronization
pulse. The time synchronization transmitter (a sepa-
rate module) plugged into the wall-outlet and used the
building’s power grid as an extended AM antenna and
was thus able to cover the entire building. Nodes were
synchronized with a 50µs pulse that was transmitted
every 10 seconds from the AM transmitter (see [14] for
details). The AM pulse has a jitter of ≤ 150µs.
We implemented our jamming avoidance scheme in-
corporating SHA1, SHA1-HMAC, gateway schedule up-
dates and neighbor information exchange in 8-bit fixed-
point C for the Atmel ATMEGA32L microcontroller
and a 16-bit 16MHz TI MSP430F22x microcontroller.
Each node ran the nano-RK[20] real-time operating sys-
tem and the RT-Link[12] link protocol. The RT-Link
TDMA cycle includes 32 frames which in turn are com-
posed of 32 slots. The slot size were assigned values from
[1 5]ms. In our tests, every node attempts to transmit
one message per frame.
We observe that most of the current hardware plat-
forms used for wireless sensor networks development are
not CPU-constrained, but have a memory limitation.
Our implementation of the SHA1-HMAC function re-
quired only 3 additional 160-bit buffers as the compari-
son of schedules and precedences is done iteratively for
all the node’s neighbors. The SHA1-HMAC function
required 12.5ms for calculations on TI’s MSP430F22x
microcontroller. For networks where maximal node’s
degree in a network is N , every node, in the worst
case, needs to execute SHA1-HMAC function (N2 + 1)
times for schedule calculation and once more for slot
size computation in every sync period. For example if
N = 5, in worst case 27 SHA1-HMAC function exe-
cutions are needed, which results in 337.5ms of CPU
time used for these calculations in every sync period,
where one sync period contains 32 · 32 = 1024 slots,
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Figure 15: Experimental setup with 3 nodes
with sizes from 1ms to 5ms. Therefore in the worst case
less than 33% of CPU processing is used for these calcu-
lations, while on average less than 11% is used. The im-
plemented schedule randomization procedure uses 276
bytes of flash memory and 400 bytes of RAM. As only
two nodes’ schedules are required at once, this requires
only 236 bytes for additional code size with 40 bytes of
data pre-initialized in flash.
In Fig. 15, we connected three nodes to the oscillo-
scope to display the transmit and receive activity. Two
nodes were programmed to be a transmit and receive
pair to show the coordinated and collision-free schedule
randomization. A third node was programmed to raise
a signal on every slot to provide a reference of the slot
boundaries. In Fig. 16, the top signal on the oscilloscope
is triggered by the transmit pin of the transmitter and
the middle signal is triggered by the receive pin on the
receiver. The signal at the bottom is triggered on every
slot interval to provide a reference of the slot bound-
aries. We observe that the schedule is both coordinated
and changes on a frame-by-frame basis.
5.1 Limitations
The WisperNet-Spatial routing scheme is centralized
and will not scale well in large networks (>500 nodes)
under moderate to heavy attack as the message from the
gateway may not get through. While several distributed
heuristics for the MST problem exist, they require a
large amount of information with respect to shortest
paths from a node to all other nodes in the network.
These schemes are not conducive to energy-constrained
and memory-constrained sensor networks. We aim to
explore distributed solutions further.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed theWisperNet anti-jamming
protocol which uses Coordinated Temporal Randomiza-
tion of transmissions (WisperNet-Time) to reduce the
censorship ratio of a statistical jammer to that of a
random jammer. A second component of WisperNet
is Coordinated Spatial Adaptation (WisperNet-Space),
where network routes are adapted continually to avoid
jammed regions (and hence random jammers).
Through simulation and experiments, we demonstrate
that WisperNet is able to effectively reduce the impact
of statistical and random jammers. Unlike coding-based
schemes, WisperNet is resilient to jamming even un-
der moderate to high link utilization with ≤2% cen-
sorship rate for the network topologies explored in this
work. The schedules derived from WisperNet are non-
repeating, with randomized packet lengths while main-
taining coordinated and collision-free communication.
WisperNet has been implemented on a network of Fire-
Fly sensor nodes with tightly synchronized operation
and low operation overhead.
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